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BREAKING BUCKS IN MONEY MARKET FUNDS
WILLIAM A. BIRDTHISTLE *
This Article argues that the Securities and Exchange Commission’s
first and most significant response to the economic crisis increases rather
than decreases the likelihood of future failures in money market funds and
the broader capital markets. In newly promulgated regulations addressing the
“breaking of the buck” in the $3 trillion money market—a debacle at the
fulcrum of the 2008 financial meltdown—the SEC endorses practices that
obfuscate rather than illuminate the capital markets, including fixed pricing
for money market funds, potentially riskier portfolio requirements, and the
continued use of discredited ratings agencies. These policies, premised
implicitly upon doubt in the ability of markets to process information
effectively, obscure the true perils of money market funds. Rather than
swaddling investment risks in misleading regulatory padding, the SEC should
illuminate the possible menace of these funds. This Article offers transparent
solutions to alleviate moral hazard and systemic risk in the broader market
and to end the regulatory subsidy of these specific investments.
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[T]he tenets that define a money market fund: sanctity of
principal, immediate liquidity, a reasonable rate of return–
all while living under the overarching rubric of boring
investors into a sound sleep.
—Bruce R. Bent, Chairman and CEO, The Reserve 1
[The Reserve] didn’t just break the buck, they shattered it.
—Don Phillips, Managing Director, Morningstar 2
INTRODUCTION
The menace of the 2008 financial crisis grew most alarming not
with the failure of exotic derivatives but with the malfunction of far more
mundane and reliable financial instruments: money market mutual funds,
sanctuary to more than $3 trillion dollars of America’s most conservative
investments. 3

1.
Letter from Bruce R. Bent, Chairman & CEO, The Reserve, to Investors
(Jan. 25, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov.Archieves/edgar/data/83335/
000110465908008455/a08-1786_1ncsrs.htm; see also, Floyd Norris, Pride Goeth Before
a Fall, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2008, 8:24 PM), http://norris.blogs.nytimes.com/
2008/09/16/pride-goeth-before-a-fall/?emc=eta1(stating that “[w]hat is most amazing is
the way bragging goes before a fall” and quoting parts of Bent’s aphorism present in two
letters Bent sent to Reserve shareholders directly before the breaking of the buck in the
Reserve’s Primary Fund).
2.
Sam Mamudi & Jonathan Burton, Money Market Breaks the Buck, Freezes
(Sept.
17,
2008,
9:11
AM),
Redemptions,
MARKETWATCH
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/money-market-fund-breaks-the-buck-freezesredemptions (“The size and speed of the withdrawals was stunning. At 3 p.m. on
Tuesday, Primary Fund’s assets stood at $23 billion, a $40 billion hit from the $62.6
billion in the fund on Friday . . . .”).
3.
See INV. CO. INST., 2010 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 160 tbl.37
(50th ed. 2010) [hereinafter ICI FACT BOOK] (listing total net assets of all U.S. money
market funds as $3,316,196,000,000 as of 2009).
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Subprime mortgage stresses metastasized into systemic threats on
September 16, 2008, 4 when one of the nation’s oldest and largest money
market funds—the Reserve Primary Fund 5—broke the buck. 6 For only
the second time in history, 7 a money market fund failed to return one
hundred cents on the dollar to its investors. To investors who considered
these funds as safe as bank savings accounts, this startling breach of faith
triggered dramatic exit, prompting a run of hundreds of billions of dollars
not just on the Primary Fund, but also across the entire money market
industry. 8 Dysfunction in money market funds cascaded into credit
markets, as funds liquidated their holdings and deprived corporations of
lenders willing to extend vital credit for day-to-day business operations. 9
Within days, the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the Federal
Reserve intervened to thaw the frozen fund industry, credit markets, and
broader capital markets by announcing that the United States of America
would temporarily guarantee all eight hundred money market funds
against losses of up to $50 billion per fund. 10 One year later, on

4.
See HENRY M. PAULSON, JR., ON THE BRINK 228–37 (2010) (“I [thenTreasury Secretary Hank Paulson] feared the start of a run on the $3.5 trillion
industry . . . .”).
5.
See Press Release, The Reserve (Sept. 16, 2008). (“[T]he NAV of the
Primary Fund, effective as of 4:00PM, is $0.97 per share.”).
6.
See Diya Gullapalli et al., Money Fund, Hurt by Debt Tied to Lehman,
Breaks the Buck, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2008, at C1 (noting that the “huge money-market
fund, the Reserve Primary Fund,” had broken the buck, marking “the first time one of
these conservative funds has had a loss in 14 years”).
7.
In 1994, the Community Bankers U.S. Government Fund—an institutional,
non-retail fund—became the first money market fund to break the buck, returning ninetysix cents per share. David Evans, Unsafe Havens, BLOOMBERG MARKETS (Oct. 2007),
http://bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=nw&pname=mm_1007_story2.html;
John
Waggoner, Billions Stream into Ultrasafe Government Funds, USA TODAY, Aug. 22,
2007, at 9A (opining that the fund was “tiny” and that “[m]ost analysts suggest that
worries about money funds . . . are unfounded”).
8.
See LAWRENCE G. MCDONALD WITH PATRICK ROBINSON, A COLOSSAL
FAILURE OF COMMON SENSE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE COLLAPSE OF LEHMAN BROTHERS
325 (2009) (noting the demise of Lehman Brothers and the resulting decisions that
“would obliterate the world’s economy”).
9.
See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY
42–47 (2010). On the interaction of money market funds and the credit markets
generally, see MATTHEW P. FINK, THE RISE OF MUTUAL FUNDS: AN INSIDER’S VIEW 77–94
(2008); MARCIA STIGUM & ANTHONY CRESCENZI, STIGUM’S MONEY MARKET 1110–15
(4th ed., 2007).
10.
See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces
Guaranty Program for Money Market Funds (Sept. 19, 2008), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1147.htm (announcing the authorization of “the
assets of the Exchange Stabilization Fund for up to $50 billion to guarantee” each money
market fund).
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September 18, 2009, 11 the government terminated this guarantee. In its
place, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) promulgated a
new set of rules 12 in February 2010 intended to “strengthen the resiliency
of money market funds.” 13
The SEC’s new money market rules are important both because
they dramatically affect a broad and important swath of credit and capital
markets, and because they may serve as a portent for extensive new SEC
rulemaking to come. The money market regulations were among the
SEC’s first significant reactions to the financial crisis of 2008; the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 14 will
require scores of new SEC rules across the entire financial landscape.
Yet the SEC’s regulatory response to the misadventures in money
market funds is troubling for several reasons and warrants careful
attention. First, the SEC’s approach embodies a conception of financial
regulation almost entirely at odds with leading economic and legal
theory. Rather than remain agnostic as to the merit of specific
investments (as neoclassical economic theory would require) 15 or
privilege the choice of socially optimal investments (as behavioral theory
would encourage), 16 the SEC appears instead to have picked the money
market fund—an increasingly problematic and vulnerable investment
mechanism—as the specific winner in this marketplace. Second, the
SEC’s new rules fundamentally misapprehend the operational dynamics
of money market funds, credit markets, and the sensitive interaction of
the two. By reducing and thus accelerating the required maturity of
portfolio holdings in money market funds and mandating the industry’s

11.
See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces
Expiration of Guaranty Program for Money Market Funds (Sept. 18, 2009), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg293.htm.
12.
See Money Market Fund Reform Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 10,060 (Mar. 4,
2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274).
13.
Mary Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, Statement on Money Market Funds Before
the Open Commission Meeting, Jan. 27, 2010, available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/2010/spch012710mls-mmf.htm.
14.
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
15.
See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW (7th ed. 2007); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984).
16.
See generally David Hirshleifer, The Blind Leading the Blind: Social
Influence, Fads, and Information Cascades, in THE NEW ECONOMICS OF HUMAN
BEHAVIOR 188 (Mariano Tonmasi & Kathryn Ierulli eds., 1995); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Introduction to JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES
(Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982); Christine Jolls & Cass R.
Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199 (2006); Dan M. Kahan &
Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149
(2006).
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continued reliance upon ratings agencies whose abysmal performance
has been widely condemned, the new rules increase rather than decrease
the likelihood of future runs on money market funds and consequential
failures of the credit markets. Third, notwithstanding the widely
unpopular fact that the rescue of failures of these instruments required
pledges of billions of dollars of public money, regulators failed to adopt
any insurance facility—public or private—to underwrite future
emergencies in this field.17 As a response to the recent failure of money
market funds, the SEC’s action is inadequate; as a prophylaxis against
their future dysfunction, it may indeed be counterproductive.
To appreciate the ramifications of the SEC’s decisions, one must
begin with an appreciation for the operations of money market funds.
Internally, and at their most fundamental, money market funds are
simply a species of investment fund like any other collective investment
vehicle. 18 While hedge funds, private equity funds, venture capital funds,
and certain mutual funds regularly invest in high-risk, high-reward
securities for their portfolios, money market funds are characterized by
their comparative conservatism. Indeed, the managers of these funds
specifically promote them as low-risk, low-reward financial havens—
cash equivalents even—and often build portfolios of only the safest and
most highly rated securities issued by governments and large
corporations. 19 Nevertheless, as the failure of the Primary Fund
demonstrated so vividly, money market funds are neither risk-free nor
insured against loss. 20 Moreover, in light of the government’s rapid and
massive bailout, the absence of salutary modifications to these funds is
likely to increase moral hazard and future systemic risk in this investing
arena.
When regulating a potentially dangerous investment, financial
authorities may choose from an array of neoclassical, behavioral, or
prudential approaches. That is, they may: (a) offer neither
encouragement nor discouragement of the particular investment but
require issuers to disclose clearly the dangers to the investing public,
thereby allowing market mechanisms to reward or punish the investment
(the neoclassical approach); 21 (b) promote to investors alternative, ideally
more socially beneficial, investments while permitting sophisticated,
fully informed investors to select riskier investments if they so choose
17.
See Money Market Fund Reform Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 10,061–62.
18.
See Money Market Fund Reform Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,688,
32,688–89 (July 8, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274). See generally
JOSEPH NOCERA, A PIECE OF THE ACTION: HOW THE MIDDLE CLASS JOINED THE MONEY
CLASS 75–88 (1994).
19.
See Money Market Fund Reform Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 32,688.
20.
See id. at 32,688–90.
21.
See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 15, at 480–86.
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(the behavioral approach); 22 or (c) require the issuer to modify the
investment to eliminate its dangers as much as possible (the prudential
approach). In the United States, the neoclassical approach is the model
most closely associated with our securities laws and regulations.
Increasingly though, legislators have adopted the behavioral approach.
The prudential, or merit-based, approach is rare in the field of U.S.
securities regulation but employed in other market sectors, such as food
and drugs, and other countries governed with greater regulatory
command and control.
Unusual everywhere is the approach the SEC has adopted in the
case of money market funds, in which it has helped to promote a
potentially dangerous investment by permitting its sponsors to downplay
rather than to disclose or eliminate inherent risks.
With its regulatory support, the SEC has collaborated in the creation
of an appearance that these investments are as safe as bank deposits
while as lucrative as mutual funds. The chief source of this similitude is
the pricing system of money market funds—permitted in no other kind of
investment fund—which closely resembles that of bank accounts.23 The
price of a typical mutual fund, known as its net asset value (NAV), is a
function of the value of its portfolio securities. As the values of
underlying investments held by a fund continually change, the fund’s
NAV will typically fluctuate also.24 When money market funds first
became available in the early 1970s, they too featured this “floating
NAV.” 25 In the late 1970s, however, financial advisors who managed
these funds persuaded the SEC to permit the use of a fixed NAV.26 By
employing a method for calculating NAV that does not rely on the daily
value of portfolio securities (mark-to-market accounting), but instead
permits the use of values that assume portfolio securities will be held to
maturity and then fully paid (amortized cost accounting), money market
funds can maintain a stable NAV of one dollar per share. 27 When this

22.
See, e.g., Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 16, at 208–16.
23.
See Money Market Fund Reform Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 32,688.
See generally Viktoria Baklanova, Money Market Funds: An Introduction to the
Literature (Jan. 26, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.ssrn.com/
abstract=1542983.
24.
William A. Birdthistle, Compensating Power: An Analysis of Rents and
Rewards in the Mutual Fund Industry, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1421 (2006).
25.
See, e.g., Valuation of Debt Instruments and Computation of Current Price
by Certain Open-End Investment Companies (Money Market Funds), 48 Fed. Reg.
32,555 (July 18, 1983) (adopting reforms that permitted money market funds to move
from floating to fixed NAVs).
26.
See Money Market Fund Reform Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 32,690.
27.
See Money Market Fund Reform Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 10060, 10,060–
61 (Mar. 4, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274).
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pricing scheme is combined with check-writing and ATM privileges, 28
money market funds look and feel a great deal more like bank savings
accounts than the mutual funds they are.
Through an infelicitous side effect of misguided regulation in the
related field of banking law, savings accounts in the late 1970s and early
1980s were forbidden by Regulation Q 29 of the Federal Reserve Act 30
from offering an interest rate of greater than 5.25 percent.31 Money
market funds could and did offer much higher returns, while projecting
the appearance of possessing an equivalent degree of security as bank
accounts, and thereby attracted massive inflows from investors. Were
these funds required to use the same pricing system as every other
mutual fund or to contribute the same deposit insurance premia as bank
accounts, they would either look a great deal less like those bank
accounts or generate materially lower but more risk-appropriate yields.
In essence, without a coherent theoretical justification, the SEC is
furnishing one particular species of investment with a regulatory subsidy
that enables these funds to win market share from bank accounts and
short-term mutual funds by generating higher rewards than the former
while falsely appearing to carry less risk than the latter.
In addition to the effect that such obfuscation has on investors
within money market funds, the SEC’s newest regulations also possess
potentially deleterious effects on credit and capital markets outside these
funds. The new rules are likely to exacerbate the same forces that
previously conspired to break the buck in money market funds.
Declining to mitigate the risk in these funds by returning either to a
floating NAV or to deposit insurance, the SEC has looked elsewhere for
“risk-limiting conditions” to ensure the safety of the fund’s
investments. 32 The SEC has chosen instead to limit the portfolios of
money market funds to only, or predominantly, securities with maturities
of very short duration on the theory that shorter-term investments are
generally less risky than longer-term ones. 33 Simultaneously, the SEC
has reiterated its requirement that funds invest only in securities awarded
high ratings from four-credit rating agencies on the theory that such a
system will eliminate the least risky investments. 34
28.
See Money Market Fund Reform Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 32,688
(“Commonly offered features, such as check-writing privileges, exchange privileges, and
near-immediate liquidity, have contributed to the popularity of money market funds.”).
29.
12 C.F.R. § 225.3 (2009).
30.
12 U.S.C. § 371a (2006).
31.
See generally R. Alton Gilbert, Requiem for Regulation Q: What It Did and
Why It Passed Away, 68 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 22 (1986).
32.
See Money Market Fund Reform Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 10,060–62.
33.
See id. at 32,690.
34.
See id. at 32,690 n.27.
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Both of these suppositions are ill-founded. On the question of
investment maturity, Professor Jeffrey Gordon argues persuasively that
shorter maturations will only accelerate future defaults in the event of
market stresses. 35 If borrowers have several weeks to repay loans, the
market will have more time to react to any developments with those
loans; if, instead, borrowers must repay or default within only a few
days, a cascade of defaults may come in a quicker flurry with less time
for rational reflection and intervention. On the question of ratings
agencies, Professor Frank Partnoy has extensively catalogued the
problems of financial systems that rely on misleading credit ratings,
which have been shown to enhance a false sense of security rather than
to convey accurate information.36 The new money market rules are thus
likely to make future, external effects of money market funds on capital
markets worse, not better.
A compelling alternative fortification for this system would be the
establishment of a public or private insurance pool to guarantee the
holdings in money market funds. As Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) insurance has demonstrated, insurance can be an
effective mechanism for circumventing bank runs. 37 All insurance costs
money, of course, and any premia paid to support future money market
funds that threaten to break the buck would almost certainly be drawn
from assets in those funds, thereby reducing their yield and net
investment returns. When these funds needed insurance during the 2008
debacle, the federal government provided it free of charge, thus
rewarding the fund sponsors’ apathy. 38 Unless changes are adopted now,
fund sponsors may reasonably believe that implicit governmental
insurance will support future failures in money market funds as well. The
market is thus likely to suffer from the moral hazard of fund sponsors
who aggressively pursue ever-higher returns without internalizing the
costs of such risky management. 39
In Part I of this Article, I discuss the economic and legal
development of money market funds in the United States, the specific
internal financial dynamics of money market funds that precipitated the
35.
Comment Letter from Jeffrey N. Gordon, Professor, Columbia Law School,
to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Sept. 9, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/ (select “Search”, search “Gordon” and “comment letter”).
36.
Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs
Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 654–79 (1999) [hereinafter
Partnoy, Siskel and Ebert].
37.
See generally Christian A. Johnson, Justice and the Administrative State:
The FDIC and the Superior Bank Failure, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 483 (2005).
38.
See Press Release, U.S. Treasury, supra note 10 (announcing the guaranty
of money market funds by the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve).
39.
See generally Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating Systemic
Moral Hazard, 57 UCLA L. REV. 183 (2009).
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breaking of the buck in the Reserve Primary Fund and the broader
external ramifications of that failure upon credit and capital markets in
the United States.
In Part II, I analyze the new rules and rationales adopted by the SEC
in the wake of the financial crisis, particularly those amending maturity
and liquidity requirements, perpetuating the reliance upon credit rating
agencies, and retaining the use of a fixed NAV in money market funds.
Specifically, I examine the degree to which these rules will—or will
not—effectively address the recent internal problems for investors in
money market funds and the external problems of future credit crises for
corporate borrowers from money market funds.
In Part III, I propose and critique an array of possible solutions
intended to address specific issues within money market funds as well as
their broader economic impact, including the return to a floating NAV,
the use of a dual-tier investment structure for retail and institutional
investors, and the establishment of some system of obligatory public,
mutual, or private deposit insurance.
I. THE GROWTH AND REGULATION OF MONEY MARKET FUNDS
In four short decades, the assets managed by money market funds in
the United States have soared from zero cents to more than three trillion
dollars. 40 Today nearly thirty cents of every dollar that Americans invest
in mutual funds flow into a money market fund. 41 The story of this
astonishing success turns on two critical developments involving
regulatory interventions: one that limited the investment returns of the
greatest competitor of money market funds, viz. bank savings accounts;
and another that liberated money market funds to emulate the appearance
of those bank savings accounts. 42 As soon as investors believed that they
could receive higher performance without sacrificing safety, they
redirected huge amounts of their savings away from bank accounts and
into money market funds. 43 But when the financial crisis of 2008
exposed the structural vulnerabilities of money market funds and
reminded the market that these funds are, in fact, far riskier than bank
accounts, investors immediately redeemed hundreds of billions of
dollars. 44 Thus the remarkable success—and recent suspicion—of money
40.
See ICI FACT BOOK, supra note 3, at 160 tbl.37.
41.
See id. at 22, 23 fig.2.1.
42.
See generally Daniel E. Levin, Breaking the Buck: The End for Money
Market Mutual Funds as We Know Them, 28 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 747 (2009).
43.
See TAMAR FRANKEL & CLIFFORD E. KIRSCH, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT
REGULATION 463–64 (3d ed. 2005).
44.
See Diana B. Henriques, The Buck Broke. So How To Retool Money
Funds?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2009, at BU13.
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market funds has long been closely entwined with their regulatory and
economic structure. 45
A. Mutual Funds and Floating NAVs
Less than forty years ago, a privately held investment advisory
company named The Reserve brought to market a new mutual fund
called the Reserve Fund. 46 The investment strategy of this novel
investment—the nation’s first money market fund—concentrated on the
extremely conservative end of the investing spectrum: the fund invested
only in securities offered by the United States government or the largest
and safest corporate issuers, and only in those securities that offered very
short-term maturities. For investors who wished to avoid the perils of
equity investments and longer-term debt offerings or the unpredictability
of a volatile stock market, a fund such as this could serve as a relatively
safe haven while still providing positive, albeit modest returns. This
simple idea would win almost universal appeal amongst both retail and
institutional investors, as soon as money market funds could modify their
pricing mechanism. 47
As do all mutual funds and indeed most collective investment
vehicles, a money market fund gathers assets by persuading investors to
invest cash in the fund through the purchase of shares in the fund. The
fund’s investment advisor then uses this collective pool of cash to
assemble an investment portfolio by purchasing securities offered by
other companies or governments. To the extent the advisor makes wise
investment decisions, the fund’s portfolio will grow in value and thus
generate a beneficial return for all the fund’s shareholders.48 Although an
investor could, of course, bypass the services of a fund and its advisor by
directly acquiring a similar portfolio of underlying securities, millions of
American individuals and institutions choose to pay funds—or, more

45.
For an excellent overview of the financial literature studying the economic
dynamics and performance of money market funds over the past four decades, see
Baklanova, supra note 23 (surveying “studies related to funds’ investment management
practices”).
46.
FINK, supra note 9, at 80–81; see also Revisions to Rules Regulating
Money Market Funds, 55 Fed. Reg. 30,239 (Jul. 25, 1990) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R.
230, 239, 270, 274).
47.
See Timothy Q. Cook & Jeremy G. Duffield, Money Market Mutual Funds
and Other Short-Term Investment Pools, in INSTRUMENTS OF THE MONEY MARKET 156,
164–65 (Timothy Q. Cook & Robert K. Laroche eds., 7th ed. 1993).
48.
Note that any growth in assets under management that accrue merely as a
function of new investors joining a fund does not increase returns to existing
shareholders. Indeed, this phenomenon generally benefits only the fund sponsor. See
Birdthistle, supra note 24, at 1425–26.
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precisely, those funds’ advisors—billions of dollars each year 49 to serve
as intermediaries to manage twelve trillion dollars in mutual fund
holdings. 50 In return, these investors gain access to the advisors’
investment expertise, instant financial diversification, and the ready
ability to redeem their investments for cash.51
1. MARK-TO-MARKET ACCOUNTING
The Investment Company Act of 1940 52 and rules promulgated
thereunder by the SEC 53 govern the general operation of money market
funds and, indeed, all registered investment companies (as mutual funds
are statutorily defined). 54 This body of law provides specific guidance on
the accounting method that advisors must use for calculating the price
that every shareholder pays for his or her shares in a mutual fund, known
as the fund’s net asset value (NAV). The standard accounting system for
mutual funds—set forth in § 2(a)(41) of the Company Act 55 in
conjunction with rules 2a-4 56 and 22c-1 57—is known as “mark-to-market
accounting.” 58 Mark-to-market accounting requires that the value of a
mutual fund’s portfolio reflect the regular fluctuations in the value of a
fund’s underlying securities, thereby causing the fund’s NAV also to
oscillate—or to float. 59
Specifically, mark-to-market accounting requires that a fund’s
advisor value the fund’s portfolio securities using market quotations
when the fund’s NAV is calculated at the close of business each day. 60
49.
See Baklanova, supra note 23, at 5 n.6 (discussing the array and magnitude
of fees associated with the management and operation of money market funds).
50.
See ICI FACT BOOK, supra note 3, at 200 n.2 (reporting total mutual fund
assets under management of more than $12 trillion in 2009).
51.
Worldwide holdings in money market funds reached a peak of $5.7 trillion
in 2009. See INV. CO. INST., WORLDWIDE MUTUAL FUND ASSETS AND FLOWS
SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES, SECOND QUARTER 2009 tbl.S4 (Oct. 29, 2009).
52.
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80(a)-51 (2006).
53.
17 C.F.R. §§ 270.2a-7, 270.22c-1 (2010).
54.
More specifically, money market funds are “open-end management
investment companies that are registered under the Investment Company Act and
regulated under rule 2a-7 under the Act.” Money Market Fund Reform Proposed Rule, 74
Fed. Reg. 32,688, 32,688 (July 8, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274).
55.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(41).
56.
17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7.
57.
§ 270.22c-1.
58.
See Money Market Fund Reform Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 32,690
(describing the rules and requirements for using the “mark-to-market” accounting
method).
59.
See id.
60.
William A. Birdthistle, The Fortunes and Foibles of Exchange-Traded
Funds: A Positive Market Response to the Problems of Mutual Funds, 33 DEL. J. CORP.
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To illustrate a simple example, picture a fund whose entire portfolio
consists only of shares in ExxonMobil. At the close of business, the
advisor would multiply the closing value of the ExxonMobil share price
by the number of the fund’s ExxonMobil shares to determine the value of
the fund’s portfolio holdings. For fund investments that trade on public
exchanges, such a computation is easily and instantaneously made. 61
With securities for which no market quotation is readily available—
such as illiquid investments in private companies, foreign markets, or
other rarely traded sectors—the valuation process is somewhat more
complicated. The fund’s board of trustees must make a good faith
determination of the portfolio securities’ fair value, which it typically
does in consultation with a third-party vendor that specializes in valuing
such illiquid investments. 62
The goal of the mark-to-market accounting system is to compute an
accurate and timely value of the fund’s portfolio.63 If a fund fails to
update the value of an outdated and illiquid holding, it will under or (as
is more likely, given the financial incentives) overvalue the total worth of
its portfolio. Because advisors are compensated via fees calculated as a
percentage of fund assets under their management, fund investors will
overpay if a fund’s portfolio is inaccurately overvalued. A classic
example of this kind of problem with fair valuation involves a fund’s
investment in a private company—for whose stock there is no publicly
traded price or regular valuation event—which has lost much of its value
but has not been updated in the fund’s overall NAV calculation.
Consider, for instance, a start-up venture whose stock costs $50 dollars
per share on January 1. If, one month later, the company were sued very
credibly for patent infringement, the value of the company’s stock would
almost certainly drop well below $50 per share, even if no publicly
traded market reflected that decline. If mutual funds investing in that
company did not lower the value of their investments accordingly, they
would in effect be overcharging their fund shareholders. 64 Mark-tomarket accounting attempts to ensure that mutual funds are regularly

L. 69, 86–87 (2008) [hereinafter Birdthistle, Fortunes and Foibles] (describing the use of
“forward pricing” in mutual funds, which results in the calculation of a price only once a
day, rather than constantly as with an exchange-traded financial product).
61.
See id.
62.
Id. at 103–04 (analyzing situations in which funds have engaged in unfair
valuations of their portfolios).
63.
See Money Market Fund Reform Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 32,690.
64.
See Stephen Choi & Marcel Kahan, The Market Penalty for Mutual Fund
Scandals, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1021 (2007) (analyzing investor flows related to claims of
market-timing and other alleged malfeasance in mutual funds).
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reporting the most accurate valuation of their portfolios, primarily to
protect the fees that fund shareholders pay. 65
In addition to holdings that are difficult to value, the calculation of
NAV also must include other, simpler computations. A fund’s cash
holdings, for instance, must also be counted, in addition to liabilities such
as administrative expenses, legal fees, and the investment advisory fee,
which must be subtracted. When the grand total is determined, that
amount is then divided by the total number of shares outstanding to
calculate a price per each fund share.66
In the first few years of their existence, money market funds such as
the Reserve Primary Fund used this mark-to-market accounting system
and, accordingly, came with what is known as a floating NAV. 67
2. THE CONSEQUENCES OF REDEMPTION
The pricing mechanism of mutual funds is relevant not only when
investors buy fund shares but even more when they choose to sell them.
Importantly, the fact that mutual fund NAVs float makes these funds, by
definition, immune from that most devastating problem in the universe of
financial withdrawals: runs on the bank. 68 The disposition of mutual fund
shares is unique in the capital markets because all mutual fund
shareholders—including money market investors—redeem, rather than
trade, their shares. 69 That is to say, when a shareholder elects to exit a
fund, he does not trade his shares on a stock exchange to some other
willing investor. Instead, the shareholder puts the shares back into the
mutual fund directly, which then pays the investor whatever the price of
the NAV happens to be at the close of business that day. This redemption
mechanism is not simply a technical trivium; it has enormous
consequences for the entire governance and operational dynamics of
mutual funds. 70
By way of contrast, consider that shares in ordinary operating
companies trade between investors on a secondary stock exchange. Thus
each of those investors buys or sells corporate shares for whatever price
the market of supply and demand produces. None of these investors is
65.
See Birdthistle, Fortunes and Foibles, supra note 60, at 103–04.
66.
See FRANKEL & KIRSCH, supra note 43, at 302.
67.
See Money Market Fund Reform Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 32,716–
17; see also Dale L. Domian & William Reichenstein, Performance and Persistence in
Money Market Fund Returns, 6 FIN. SERVS. REV. 169, 171–72 (1997).
68.
See generally Presentment of Check During Run on Bank, 49 BANKING L.J.
173 (John Edson Brady ed., 1932) (reviewing legal principles of liability attaching to
various parties in the event of a run on the bank).
69.
See Birdthistle, Fortunes and Foibles, supra note 60, at 90.
70.
See ICI FACT BOOK, supra note 3, at 42–44.
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guaranteed access to their actual monetary investment in the corporation.
Ordinary corporations, unlike mutual funds, accordingly feature what is
known as “capital lock-in.” 71 Once early investors commit their
investment to the corporation through an initial public offering or other
stock offering, the only ways in which capital may subsequently flow out
of the corporation back to its investors are through dividends—which are
authorized by the board of directors, not the shareholders—or
liquidations upon the bankruptcy or dissolution of a corporation. 72 What
subsequent buyers of these shares are willing to pay thus turns largely
upon what they believe the future prospects of a corporation are and how
those prospects affect the net present value of shares today. 73 These
trading dynamics, when coupled with the ability to sell corporate shares
short and to separate economic and voting rights of shares, contribute to
the creation of a market for corporate control with control premia in
typical corporations.74 Redemption at NAV in mutual funds, by contrast,
virtually eliminates such governance mechanisms in those funds.75
But in both corporations and mutual funds (and, formerly, money
market funds), the fact that their share prices or NAVs float immediately
places all investors on notice that the value of their investment can also
rise or fall. 76 Indeed, each trading day of the year, the value of their
investment almost certainly will rise or fall, either a few basis points or
even multiple percentage points.77 Thus the risk of loss—indeed, even of
total loss—is a real and omnipresent feature of these investments,
engineered into their most salient feature: their price.

71.
See generally Lynn Stout, On the Nature of Corporations, 2005 U. ILL. L.
REV. 253 (describing and discussing “capital lock-in”).
72.
See id. at 255–58.
73.
See id. at 265; Levin, supra note 42, at 749.
74.
See Anupam Chandar, Corporate Law’s Distributive Design, 118 YALE L.J.
POCKET
PART
82
(2008),
http://thepocketpart.org/2008/10/28/
chanderresponse.html.
75.
See John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why
Governance and Fee Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, YALE L.J. (forthcoming
2010), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1547162 (arguing that redemption
eliminates the need for and efficacy of other standard corporate governance mechanisms
in mutual funds).
76.
See Press Release, President’s Working Grp. on Fin. Mkts., Money Market
Fund Reform Options 19–23 (Oct. 2010) (“By making gains and losses a regular
occurrence, as they are in other mutual funds, a floating NAV could alter investor
expectations and make clear that MMFs are not risk-free vehicles.”).
77.
See id.
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3. THE PHENOMENON OF RUNS
Because of their floating prices, however, one risk that was not
historically present in either corporate or mutual fund investments was
that of a run. A run on a financial institution requires, as a prerequisite,
some sort of promise by the institution of a guaranteed return to its
counterparties. 78 A run then occurs when counterparties of the promising
institution fear that the institution no longer holds assets sufficient to
fulfill all of its obligations.79 In such a circumstance, the first parties to
divest from the institution are the most likely to receive their entire
deposit, while laggards may receive nothing at all.80 The dynamics of
this situation thus encourage counterparties to rush with as much haste as
possible to withdraw their monies before the institution runs completely
dry. 81 In a mutual fund, such a phenomenon is structurally impossible,
because the fund never makes the initial promise to pay out anything
more than each share’s pro rata portion of the fund’s total assets. 82
If a fund’s NAV were to drop by 10 percent overnight, for example,
the consequences would be identical whether one investor redeemed or
every investor redeemed. Each investor in the fund would receive 90
percent of the original value. In an institution that guaranteed full
payment, however, the dynamics would be quite different. The first 90
percent of investors to withdraw would receive 100 percent of their
deposits, while the last 10 percent would receive nothing. Not wishing to
be one of the latter, every investor with time and knowledge will hurry to
be one of the former, exacerbating the velocity of the run. 83 When money
market funds used to operate with floating NAVs, such runs were neither
possible nor appeared to be so because investors could readily appreciate
the fact that they were guaranteed nothing more than their portion of the
fund’s inconstant total. Once money market funds adopted fixed NAVs,
however, money market investors could then misconstrue the constant
price—$1.00 per share—as an implicit guarantee that their investment
was steadfast. And thus with a switch from floating to fixed pricing was
78.
See Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing Financial Regulation, 90 B.U. L.
REV. 1, 21–25 (2010) (stating that “the drop below one dollar per share” in the Reserve’s
breaking of the buck “raised the same concerns that spark a bank run – a loss of
confidence over financial stability, fueled by uncertainty over the value of the [money
market fund’s] assets, causing widespread redemptions across the industry”); Richard
McAdams, Beyond the Prisoner’s Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory, and Law, 82 S.
CAL. L. REV. 209, 216 (2009) (discussing whether “[b]ank runs represent a classic
prisoner’s dilemma”).
79.
Whitehead, supra note 78, at 21.
80.
Id. at 13.
81.
Id.
82.
See FRANKEL & KIRSCH, supra note 43, at 301–02.
83.
See McAdams, supra note 78, at 216–17.
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laid the foundation of the massive run on money market funds that
occurred during the 2008 financial crisis.84
B. Regulation Q and Limits on Interest in Bank Accounts
Bank accounts are perhaps the archetypical example of a financial
instrument with a fixed obligation. Unlike corporate securities and
typical fund investments, bank accounts guarantee deposits with returns
certain. 85 For investors seeking safety, banks are often the option of first
resort. Of course, most investors would wish, in addition to that
downside protection, for their deposits at least to keep pace with inflation
and not merely to remain static over time. To that end, banks offer
savings accounts that guarantee more than just the safety of deposits.
Although the dangers of banks promising more interest than they can
deliver are easy to imagine, the original sin of banks vis-à-vis money
market funds was quite the opposite: their failure to promise enough.
1. GUARANTEED RETURNS, RATINGS AND INSURANCE
Banks offer certainty to their depositors through contractual
guarantees to repay, not by merely chancing their pricing process to
market performance. 86 As long as a bank remains solvent, the bank is
contractually obliged to make all of its depositors whole. Poor
performance in the market generally, or of the bank’s investments
specifically, has no legal bearing on the bank’s obligations to its
depositors. 87
How then might a bank fulfill its promise to honor deposits? There
are two principal ways. The easiest would be for the bank simply to leave
the depositors’ money intact in a vault and not to touch it at all. All funds
would then be waiting for depositors whenever they wished to withdraw
them. Of course, such a system is far from how banks operate. Instead,
banks attempt to put their depositors’ funds to work by lending or
investing the money in search of a positive return. To the extent a bank
makes a successful return on those investments—which can be done
through very conservative and comparatively safe investments—the bank
can both preserve the integrity of its account-holders’ deposits while also
making a profit for itself. Indeed, in savings accounts, banks will go

84.
See Henriques, supra note 44, at BU 13.
85.
See Levin, supra note 42, at 750 (“The contractual terms of the deposit
agreement, not market factors, govern the obligation of the bank to pay the depositor her
principal.”).
86.
Id.
87.
Id.

BIRDTHISTLE – FINAL

2010:1155

12/14/2010 2:22 PM

Breaking Bucks

1171

further by promising not simply to return 100 percent of deposits but to
supplement that amount by an additional rate of modest interest.
Of course, the greater the magnitude of return a bank promises its
depositors, the riskier its use of the depositors’ funds may become. 88 To
generate modest returns, a bank might lend funds only to lenders with
outstanding credit scores, large equity cushions, and strong collateral
guarantees. This sort of lending is precisely what occurs when a bank
“buys” or “invests” in a Treasury bill—the bank is lending its depositors’
money to the U.S. government, the institution with the strongest credit
and collateral in the world, at the moment. 89 Of course, the safer and
stronger the borrower, the less the borrower will pay to borrow money,
so the return on Treasury bills is comparatively low. To increase returns,
a bank could lend to large private institutions such as publicly traded
corporations, which do not wield the full faith and credit of a sovereign
power, but have historically boasted of excellent credit-worthiness. 90
Because these corporations do not have the supporting resources of the
U.S. government, they must entice lenders by offering higher rates of
interest. For banks seeking a return, the trade-off between risk and return
is clear. As they seek increasingly higher interest rates for their
depositors, or higher profits for themselves, they must lend funds to
borrowers with ever-higher risks. 91
Assessing the risk of borrowers is thus a primary concern of the
credit markets. 92 A bank might perform extensive due diligence on each
potential counterparty to assess its credit risk, but such a process would
be expensive, time-consuming, and duplicative. Instead, institutions
called Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations
(NRSROs) 93—better known as credit ratings agencies, such as Standard
& Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch 94—serve as informational intermediaries
by evaluating the creditworthiness of most major borrowers in the
markets and assigning them grades that are readily interpreted by a wide
universe of potential lenders.95 A bank, and indeed any lender, can thus

88.
See generally NOCERA, supra note 18 (discussing how middle class
investors became more willing to acquire debt and accept risk through their growing
participation in stocks, mutual funds, and money market accounts).
89.
See id. at 77–80.
90.
See FINK, supra note 9.
91.
See Levin, supra note 42, at 763–65.
92.
See generally Niall Ferguson, Remarks at the Carnegie Council Global
Ethics Forum: The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World (Nov. 20, 2008),
available at http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/video/data/000094.
93.
See Money Market Reform Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,688, 32,724
(July 8, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274).
94.
See Partnoy, supra note 36, at 639.
95.
Id. at 621–22.
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conform the degree of risk and reward it is willing to pursue by lending
only to institutions with certain credit ratings. 96 Extremely conservative
institutions highly concerned with the safety of their investments, such as
banks, might permit loans only to governments or corporate issuers with
the highest ratings. 97
Notwithstanding a conservative investment approach marked by
scrupulous reliance upon independent ratings, a bank’s loan may still fail
of course. If a borrower defaults or goes bankrupt, the bank’s loan is
likely to become worthless quickly. The bank may then hold insufficient
assets to honor contractual guarantees to its own depositors. As we have
seen, these are the circumstances that very easily may spark a run on the
bank. 98
Because of this risk—and hard-learned experience—bank accounts
are now insured against loss by the FDIC, an independent government
agency created by the U.S. Congress to “maintain stability and public
confidence in the nation’s financial system[] by insuring deposits [in
banks].” 99 The FDIC insures each depositor up to at least $250,000 per
institution. 100 Not only does this facility reimburse significant potential
losses, its presence forestalls runs on banks. 101 Because deposits are
guaranteed, individual depositors have no need or incentive to sprint to
withdraw their funds in the event of a bank failure. The FDIC has
worked remarkably well at both preserving deposits and preventing
runs. 102 Of course, no insurance comes without a premium, and every
penny paid to insure a bank account comes directly out of the potential
interest returns on that account.
2. THE RISE AND DEMISE OF REGULATION Q
But deposit insurance has not been the only source of friction to
drag the returns of bank accounts lower than comparable investments
free from insurance and its premia. The most important historical
limitation on the interest rates of bank accounts was a regulatory

96.
See id. at 629–30.
97.
Id. at 622 n.12
98.
See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 199 (2008)
(describing bank runs and their dynamics as classic examples of systemic risk).
99.
FDIC Mission, Vision, and Values, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION, http://www.fdic.gov/about/mission/index.html.
100.
Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Basic FDIC Insurance Coverage
Permanently Increased to $250,000 Per Depositor (Jul. 21, 2010),
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2010/pr10161.html.
101. See id.
102. See Schwarcz, supra note 98, at 211 (noting the salutary effects of the
creation of the FDIC).
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restriction: Regulation Q. 103 For more than half a century, from 1933
until 1986, Regulation Q imposed a ceiling on the rates that banks could
pay on savings deposits. 104
Through the Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935, Congress enacted
Regulation Q to authorize the Federal Reserve to set the permissible rates
of interest that banks would be allowed to pay their customers. 105 These
price ceilings had multiple purposes: “[T]o encourage country banks to
lend more in their local communities rather than hold balances with
larger banks in financial centers,” 106 to improve liquidity in the banking
system; and “to increase bank profits by limiting the competition for
deposits” because “competition for deposits not only reduced bank
profits by raising interest expenses, but also might cause banks to acquire
riskier assets with higher expected returns in attempts to limit the erosion
of their profits.” 107
In the 1970s, policymakers wielded Regulation Q to impose ceiling
rates that rested below market rates of interest, a decision with quick and
powerful consequences. 108 Throughout the late 1960s and all of the
1970s, the ceiling rate under Regulation Q never rose above 6 percent.
During the same period, however, the three-month Treasury bill offered
interest rates almost always significantly higher, even spiking above 14
percent at times.109 Investors seeking returns could obviously do far
better by investing their money outside rather than inside bank
accounts. 110 Predictably, investors eagerly sought out investment
vehicles that were not restricted by Regulation Q’s limits on interest. 111
The newly introduced Primary Reserve Fund and its ilk were just such
investments.
C. Money Market Funds and Fixed NAVs
As we have seen, money market funds in their earliest
incarnations—like all other mutual funds—originally featured a floating

103. See generally Gilbert, supra note 31 (reviewing the history, administration,
and goals of Regulation Q).
104. See id. at 22.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 23.
108. See Joseph A. DiNuzzo, The Depository Institutions Deregulation
Committee: Did It Achieve the Goal?, 101 BANKING L.J. 100, 100–01 (1984).
109. See Gilbert, supra note 31, at 29 fig.3.
110. See Kenneth T. Rosen & Larry Katz, Money Market Mutual Funds: An
Experiment in Ad Hoc Deregulation, 36 J. FIN. 1011, 1011, 1015 (1983).
111. See Gilbert, supra note 31, at 29–30.
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NAV that differed markedly from the fixed return of bank accounts. 112
But throughout the 1970s, sponsors of mutual funds petitioned the SEC
for, and received, exemptions to use an alternative to the mark-to-market
accounting technique. 113 By using a method known as amortized-cost
accounting, 114 money market funds could maintain a stable NAV that
looks much more like the valuation of a bank deposit, thus dramatically
closing the gap in appearances between the two instruments. This pricing
change occurred just as Regulation Q was artificially suppressing bank
interest rates far lower than market interest rates. Thus by looking like a
bank account, yet offering far higher yields, money market funds became
tremendously popular. 115
1. AMORTIZED-COST ACCOUNTING
In its June 2009 release proposing new regulations for money
market funds, the SEC describes the operation and consequences of
amortized-cost method of valuation as follows:
Under the amortized cost method, portfolio securities are valued
at cost plus any amortization of premium or accumulation of
discount (“amortized cost”). The basic premise underlying
money market funds’ use of the amortized cost method of
valuation is that high-quality, short-term debt securities held
until maturity will eventually return to the amortized cost value,
regardless of any current disparity between the amortized cost
value and market value, and would not ordinarily be expected to
fluctuate significantly in value.116
In exchange for promising to invest only in “high-quality, short-term
debt securities,” 117 the SEC permitted money market funds to use this
method of accounting. Indeed, after numerous fund sponsors made
identical petitions and promises, the SEC amended Rule 2a-7 to permit
all money market funds to use this method. 118 As a consequence, all
money market funds gained the ability to maintain a stable NAV of

112. See supra text accompanying notes 24–25.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 25–27.
114. See Money Market Fund Reform Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,688,
32,688 (July 8, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274).
115. See Gilbert, supra note 30, at 31, 32–33; Levin, supra note 42, at 752–53.
116. Money Market Fund Reform Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 32,690.
117. Id.
118. See id.
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$1.00 per share. 119 In effect, they now look extremely similar to bank
accounts with guaranteed returns.120
The similarity to bank accounts was heightened by money market
funds’ adoption of several additional bank-like features. First, money
market funds adopted a penny-rounding method of pricing, in which “the
current net asset value per share is rounded to the nearest one percent”
when calculating NAV for the “purposes of distribution, redemption and
repurchase.” 121 Once the price of money market funds was thus
stabilized, other features that rely upon pricing predictability became
common, such as “check-writing privileges, exchange privileges, and
near-immediate liquidity.” 122
Once money market funds began to enjoy early success, the
resemblance to bank accounts was made complete with a misjudgment
by banks themselves. 123 Witnessing their customers flee bank accounts
for the higher returns of money market funds, banks fought back first by
lobbying for the elimination of Regulation Q and then by offering
something they called “money market deposit accounts.” 124 The name of
this novel product was simply a marketing tactic, albeit a poor one. This
kind of new bank account had no “relationship to the money market
other than via the name of its nemesis, the money market mutual
fund.” 125 Instead, it was simply “a deposit account product designed to
make consumers believe that it was the same as the money market
mutual funds that those consumers had come to love.” 126 But increasing
the level of confusion did not help banks—money market funds
continued to grow, and investors increasingly came to assume they
possessed bank-like security. 127 Indeed, with the two similarly named
instruments now competing head-to-head, the money market mutual
funds would prevail because they did not carry insurance and thus did
not deduct insurance premia from their returns. Compared to an FDICinsured instrument, like money market deposit accounts, they would
always bring greater returns—as well as greater risk.

119. See id. at 32,688, 32,690.
120. See, e.g., Richard A. Booth, Things Happen, 55 VILL. L. REV. 57, 64 (2010)
(“Consumers developed unrealistic expectations about money market funds (MMFs).
Consumers came to assume that MMFs were equivalent to an insured checking account
that paid interest.”).
121. Money Market Fund Reform Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 32,690 n.23.
122. Id. at 32688.
123. See Levin, supra note 42, at 753–54.
124. Id. at 752–53, 756.
125. Id. at 756.
126. Id. at 757.
127. See ICI FACT BOOK, supra note 3, at 160 tbl.37.
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2. THE GROWTH OF MONEY MARKET FUNDS

The fact that money market funds quickly took on the appearance of
bank accounts, while offering far higher rates of return—because they
were not restricted by Regulation Q and not subject to insurance
premia—triggered tremendous growth in these investments. 128 From
1970, when they contained no money whatsoever, until their peak in
2008, money market funds accumulated almost $4 trillion in assets under
management. 129 During that time, they grew from zero funds to more
than one thousand at their peak in 1999.130
Currently, more than seven hundred and fifty money market funds
are registered with the SEC. In aggregate, they hold more than $3.2
trillion, which represents approximately 30 percent of all assets invested
in the entire mutual fund industry. 131 The money market field has also
specialized to a significant degree, and now features prime funds,
government funds, and tax-exempt funds. 132 Prime funds typically hold
an assortment of “taxable short-term obligations issued by corporations
and banks, as well as repurchase agreements and asset backed
commercial paper secured by pools of assets.”133 Government funds
“principally hold obligations of the U.S. Government, including
obligations of the U.S. Treasury and federal agencies and
instrumentalities, as well as repurchase agreements collateralized by
Government securities.” 134 Investing in the private sector is generally
considered riskier than investing in government securities, so prime
funds usually offer a higher rate of return, while government funds offer
greater safety. Tax-exempt funds “primarily hold obligations of state and
local governments and their instrumentalities, and pay interest that is
generally exempt from federal income taxes.” 135
Perhaps the major development of money market funds in recent
years concerns the nature of the shareholders who purchase shares in the
funds. Initially, money market funds sought investment from individuals.
Today, institutional investors—such as corporations, hedge funds,
pension funds, and governmental entities—use money market funds to

128. See id.
129. See id. at 126 tbl.3.
130. See id. at 128 tbl.5.
131. See id. at 22, 126; Money Market Fund Reform Proposed Rule, 74 Fed.
Reg. 32,688, 32,688–89 (July 8, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274).
132. See Money Market Fund Reform Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 32,689.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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“outsource[]” their cash management operations. 136 Institutional
investors now own approximately 66 percent of assets in these funds.137
But the impact of money market funds is not confined simply to the
internal dynamics of funds and their investors. This enormous investment
pool also interacts importantly with the broader money and credit
markets, in which money market funds use their $3 trillion to buy and
sell short-term investments. 138 Those external affairs of money market
funds played a significant role in the financial crisis of 2008. 139
D. Breaking the Buck and Financial Crisis
Stresses in the U.S. financial system that had built up throughout
2008 reached a critical point in mid-September of that year when
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. declared bankruptcy. 140 The bankruptcy
of Lehman Brothers caused the Reserve Primary Fund first to break its
buck and then to experience a run by its shareholders.141 The Primary
Fund held $63 billion in assets under management, of which it had
invested $785 million—or more than 1.2 percent of its portfolio—in
commercial paper issued by Lehman Brothers.142 When Lehman
Brothers went bankrupt, the value of its commercial paper plummeted to
zero. Thus, the Primary Fund instantly lost $785 million in value, which
dropped its NAV per share from $1.00 to $0.97 143 and thereby broke its
buck. 144
Although that loss may not appear substantial, when applied to large
investment holdings, shareholders stood to lose hundreds of millions of
dollars that they had assumed were rock solid. More importantly, the loss
triggered a run on the fund that threatened to impose far greater losses on
136. Id.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See PAULSON, supra note 4, at 234–38.
140. See MCDONALD, supra note 8, at 324–25; Steven M. Davidoff & David
Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 61
ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 504–08 (2009) (noting the role of money market funds and the
Reserve’s breaking of the buck in the cascade of events culminating in the financial crisis
of 2008); Edward R. Morrison, Is the Bankruptcy Code an Adequate Mechanism for
Resolving the Distress of Systemically Important Institutions?, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 449, 451
(2009).
141. See Mamudi & Burton, supra note 2.
142. See id.
143. Id.
144. See Mercer E. Bullard, Federally-Insured Money Market Funds and Narrow
Banks: The Path of Least Insurance, (March 2, 2009) (unpublished article), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1351987 (“An [money market fund] is permitted to maintain a
$1.00 per share NAV only as long as the per share market value of its holdings does not
drop below $0.995.”).
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the last investors remaining in the fund. 145 When large institutional
investors learned that the Primary Fund was writing down its Lehman
holdings to zero, they immediately attempted to redeem their shares. 146 If
the Reserve honored its commitment to these shareholders, it would have
had to pay the departing institutional investors $1.00 for every redeemed
share. As each early investor left the fund with fully intact redemptions,
the $785 million loss would grow into an ever-increasing percentage of
loss for the stragglers. Just as in a classic bank run, the first depositors
out the door might exit with their entire holdings until the bank’s
reserves are exhausted, at which point remaining depositors would
receive nothing. 147 To avoid this outcome, smaller investors in the fund
sued to enjoin all redemptions until a federal court could oversee an
orderly liquidation of the entire fund on a pro rata basis. 148
In addition to these internal dynamics among the money market
fund, its sponsor, and its investors, the failure of the Primary Fund
dramatically illustrated the interdependence between money market
funds and the capital markets. When shareholders in the fund first
demanded redemptions, the Primary Fund quickly paid out its available
cash reserves to satisfy those requests.149 Once all of the fund’s cash had
been redeemed, the only way the fund could satisfy additional
redemptions was to sell portfolio holdings. 150 Just like widespread
145. See Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J.
CORP. L. 469, 488–90 (2010).
While causality is difficult to establish, most observers believe that the fear
resulting from the Lehman filing and the implications for Reserve Primary
Fund spilled over into redemption requests at other money market funds,
many of which had negligible exposure to Lehman. Systemic concerns were
substantial, because many corporate borrowers rely on the commercial paper
market to fund their short-term operations, and a run on money market funds
takes needed capital out of this market.
Id. at 489.
146. See Henriques, supra note 44.
147. See Press Release, President’s Working Grp. on Fin. Mkts., supra note 76,
at 11–13 (discussing the run on the Reserve Primary Fund); Andrew B. Lyon, Money
Market Funds and Shareholder Dilution, 39 J. FIN. 1011 (1984).
148. See Kara McGuire, Ameriprise Sues Managers of Troubled Money Fund,
MINN. STAR-TRIB., Sept. 19, 2008, at D1, D2 (“With billions of dollars of client money at
stake, Minneapolis broker-dealer Ameriprise Financial Inc. on Friday sued New York
fund manager the Reserve Management Co., alleging it tipped off big institutional
investors about its troubled money market fund, the Primary Fund, but not smaller
investors.”); see also In the Matter of The Reserve Fund, Investment Company Act, 73
Fed. Reg. 55,572, 55,572 (Sept. 25, 2008) (in which the SEC issued an order permitting
the suspension of redemptions in certain Reserve funds to permit their orderly
liquidation).
149. See Money Market Fund Reform Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,688,
32,691 (July 8, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274).
150. Id.
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margin calls in a bear market, the fund’s rapid sale of its holdings further
depressed the market valuations of those securities. As shareholders in
other money market funds witnessed the collapse of Lehman Brothers’
commercial paper, the potential bankruptcy of similar financial
borrowers, the run on the Primary Fund, and the downward pressure on
prices by rapid liquidations in the credit markets, they too sought
redemptions and thus precipitated runs on other money market funds.151
Of course, money market funds had suffered losses in their
portfolios previously—the collapse of Lehman Brothers paper was
dramatic but certainly not the first time an investment held by a money
market fund had unexpectedly declined in value. Indeed, once
previously—though only once—a money market fund had broken its
buck. 152 But well over a dozen times previously, losses in a money
market fund’s portfolio had threatened to break the buck. 153 In each of
those other cases, however, the investment advisor managing the fund
had itself stepped in to prevent the buck from breaking. 154 To do so, the
advisor or one of its affiliates paid full price for whatever holding in the
fund’s portfolio had fallen in value and threatened the integrity of the
fund’s price. 155 Thus, the fund was made whole, the advisor absorbed the
loss, and the fund shareholders might never have known the difference.
Of course, for an advisor to absorb these losses, it must have sufficient
resources to do so. Many fund advisors are affiliates of major financial
institutions, with large pools of capital at their disposal, and have proven
capable of engineering these internal bailouts.156 The Reserve, however,
is a much smaller and independently owned operation. And, in the case
of its Lehman Brothers losses, it simply did not have the financial
wherewithal to pump $785 million into the fund.157
Immediately after the Primary Fund broke its buck, investors
redeemed approximately $300 billion from other prime funds.158 Bracing
themselves for runs on their own funds, other advisors of money market
151. See id. at 32,691–92.
152. In 1994, the Community Bankers U.S. Government Fund became the first
money market fund to break the buck, when its price per share fell four cents short of the
$1.00 level. See Mamudi & Burton, supra note 2.
153. Id.
154. See Bullard, supra note 144, at 10 (“On occasions when [money market
funds’] share values have declined below or have come close to declining below $0.995,
their sponsors have purchased the impaired portfolio securities at their face value,
injected cash into the fund, or taken other steps to prevent the fund’s price from dropping
below $1.00 per share.”).
155. See Money Market Fund Reform Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 32,690–
91.
156. See id.
157. See id. at 32,691.
158. See id. at 32,691–92.

BIRDTHISTLE – FINAL

1180

12/14/2010 2:22 PM

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

funds retained their cash positions rather than continue to invest as
normal in money market securities. 159 With this complete cessation of
new investment in short-term debt instruments, the money market
consequently “seized up” and thus “impair[ed] access to credit in shortterm private debt markets.” 160 That is to say, the nation’s large operating
companies immediately lost access to huge sources of loans that they
used continually to manage their daily operations.
To halt the spread of this credit debacle across the broader economy,
the U.S. government announced massive and immediate measures. On
September 19, 2008, the Treasury and the Federal Reserve announced a
Temporary Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds, “an
unprecedented market intervention by the federal government in order to
stabilize and provide liquidity to the short-term markets” 161 by insuring
each of the country’s money market funds against losses of up to $50
billion per fund. 162
Soporific money market funds no longer bored their investors into a
sound sleep, as the head of the Reserve, Bruce Bent, had previously
suggested. 163 On the contrary, their failures had precipitated a potentially
calamitous failure of the U.S. economy and triggered massive and
unprecedented government intervention.
II. A CRITIQUE OF THE NEW REGULATIONS AND RATIONALES
Almost a year and a half after the breaking of the Primary Fund’s
buck and its collateral damage, the SEC finalized new rules that attempt
to grapple with the failures of money market funds. 164 While the Federal
Reserve and the Treasury Department wielded both the monies and the
authority to play a more immediate and prominent role in addressing the
financial crisis, the SEC’s reaction to those events is only now becoming
clear through its more deliberate regulatory response. But the SEC’s new
revisions to Rule 2a-7—which tinker with permissible portfolio holdings,
perpetuate the use of discredited ratings agencies, and cling to the fixed
NAV 165—are a deeply disappointing response to money market funds
specifically. As a portent of the SEC’s broad swath of future rulemaking

159. See id. at 32,692.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Diana B. Henriques, Rescue Plan for Funds Will Come at a Price, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 20, 2008, at C1.
163. See Norris, supra note 1.
164. See Money Market Fund Reform Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 10,060, 10,060
(Mar. 4, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274).
165. See id. at 10,060–63.
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under the Dodd-Frank legislation in response to the financial crisis, 166
these money market rules are particularly troubling.
The SEC’s new approach exhibits a conception of financial
regulation remarkably inconsistent with widely accepted economic and
legal theory. While neoclassical economic theory counsels regulators to
remain detached as to the merit of specific investments,167 and behavioral
theory permits the privileging of certain, socially optimal investments, 168
the SEC has chosen an altogether different path. The SEC has instead
extended a policy of providing a regulatory subsidy to one specific
investment vehicle, money market funds, at the expense of others. That
is, rather than establishing a neutral ground on which bank deposits,
short-term bond funds, and other investment vehicles compete evenly
against one another, the SEC has picked a winner by tilting the field
towards money market funds, which have just demonstrated their
profound weaknesses and vulnerability.
In conducting a post-mortem of the dynamics of money market
funds during the recent crisis, analysts and regulators must identify the
most salient defect and then the most relevant solutions. The most
important failure of the Reserve Fund was not the unfortunate roiling of
its internal shareholders by a run on the fund but, instead, the widespread
and deleterious external effects on the credit and capital markets. After
all, the particular investors of the Reserve Fund, after the orderly judicial
liquidation of the fund, ultimately lost only one cent on the dollar.169 As
Professor Richard Booth states, “it is arguable that breaking the buck is
no big deal. Plenty of depositors would have taken some risk for a little
return on their checking accounts.” 170 But the effects of money market
malfunction on the broader marketplace were far more serious, both in
terms of the billions of dollars required to forestall them and the millions
of companies and citizens stymied by the resulting loss of credit. Yet the
regulations passed by the SEC do not appear to target these more
worrisome systemic vulnerabilities.
166. See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
167. See generally POSNER, supra note 15.
168. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 104 (2008).
169. See S.E.C. Plan to Distribute Money Fund Is Accepted, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
25, 2009, at B3 (“The estimated $3.5 billion remaining assets of the Reserve Primary
Fund should be distributed on a prorated basis to shareholders, a federal judge ruled on
Wednesday in response to lawsuits filed after the fund’s value dropped below $1 a share
in September 2008. . . . In a ruling that largely accepts a distribution plan proposed by the
Securities and Exchange Commission, the judge said that regulators and the fund’s
trustees estimated that investors would recover 99 cents a share if remaining assets were
distributed pro rata.”).
170. Booth, supra note 120, at 65.
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A. Shorter Maturity and Greater Liquidity

The most serious technical deficiency of the SEC’s new rules is the
agency’s mistaken view of the ways in which money market funds
interact with the broader credit markets. 171 This misapprehension is
manifest in the SEC’s new requirements that the composition of
portfolios in money market funds consist of investments of shorter
maturity and greater liquidity. 172 Generally speaking, investments with
shorter maturity and greater liquidity carry less risk to the investors who
hold them but, as Professor Gordon illuminates, the SEC’s new rules
actually increase risk to the broader financial system. 173 Inasmuch as
investors in even the broken Reserve Fund lost only 1 percent of their
holdings, 174 the systemic effects of the broken buck are clearly far more
important.
In its revisions to Rule 2a-7, the SEC has reduced the average
weighted maturity of permissible money market investments from ninety
days to sixty days. 175 Similarly, the weighted average life of these
permissible investments is now limited to one hundred and twenty
days. 176 The SEC argues that these shorter time horizons decrease a
fund’s exposure to interest-rate risk, decrease the amplification of credit
and interest-rate spreads on a fund, and reduce liquidity risk because a
greater percentage of a fund’s investments will mature on a daily or
weekly basis. 177 While these arguments are relatively uncontroversial,
they apply only to the internal dynamics of funds. That is, they are
intended to protect money market funds from the dangers of their own
portfolio investments.
But, as Gordon argues, the SEC’s attempt to limit risks within
money market funds “adds systemic risk to financial intermediation by
heightening the pressure on short-term money markets,” a “flaw” that is
“fundamental and requires a rethinking of the general [money market
fund] framework.” 178
The premise of the SEC’s tightening of portfolio requirements in
money market funds rests upon the SEC’s earlier decision to permit fixed
NAVs. That is, in order to ensure that funds with fixed NAVs never
171. See Money Market Fund Reform Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 10,060, 10,099
(Mar. 4, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274).
172. See id. at 10,070–78.
173. See Letter from Jeffrey N. Gordon to Elizabeth M. Murphy, supra note 35,
at 3.
174. See S.E.C. Plan to Distribute Money Fund is Accepted, supra note 169.
175. See Money Market Fund Reform Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 10,070.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Letter from Jeffrey N. Gordon to Elizabeth M. Murphy, supra note 35, at 2.
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experience precipitous or dramatic declines in their portfolios—a step
necessary to ensure that these funds do not experience runs like those in
2008—the SEC has elected to place substantive constraints on the kinds
of portfolio securities in which these funds may invest. 179 And if short
maturities are relatively riskless, the thinking appears to go, then even
shorter maturities must be safer still. But the relatively minor
improvement in the quantum of risk experienced by fund investors when
the maturity is reduced from ninety to sixty days is vastly outweighed by
the comparatively major increase in the systemic risk. As Gordon notes,
“by shortening maturities the SEC proposal [now rule] will increase
rather [than] reduce the fragility of these markets because it makes it
easier for [money market funds] to ‘run’ at a time of financial
distress.” 180
Gordon’s argument becomes clearer when one considers the
interests of counterparties to money market funds. Money market funds
buy short-term debt—that is, they lend money to the issuers of that
debt—from corporations who need funds to pay for daily operations such
as payroll and trade vendors. 181 Any solvent corporation could, of course,
choose not to borrow money for these mundane and predictable
purposes. A large enterprise such as General Electric, for example, could
simply ensure that it maintained a cash reserve large enough to cover
daily or weekly expenditures. But in order to do so, General Electric
would need to pay very close attention to its cash flow and, to avoid
miscalculating, would need to include a conservative buffer of more cash
than it ever actually needed. 182 Devoting resources to the careful and
conservative management of cash flow necessarily depletes resources
that could be used to expand General Electric’s more profitable
enterprises. 183 Perhaps it cannot build a new and more efficient plant
because those funds would deplete cash reserves too much, so the
company persists with outdated facilities. If, instead, General Electric
could simply borrow at short notice and little cost whatever funds it
needed to cover daily outlays, and then repay those loans right away, the
corporation could operate far more leanly and efficiently. 184 And, given
the overall size and soundness of its operations, the creditworthy
corporation could certainly obtain an extremely short-term loan for very

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Money Market Fund Reform Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 10,070.
Letter from Jeffrey N. Gordon to Elizabeth M. Murphy, supra note 35, at 3.
See STIGUM & CRESCENZI, supra note 9, at 51–53.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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low prices. This process, writ large, drives much of the money market in
the United States. 185
But now imagine the effect of the new SEC rules. If every money
market fund reduces the average maturity of its holdings from ninety
days to sixty days, borrowers such as General Electric will have, on
average, that much less time to repay their loans. Normally, this
abbreviated schedule should not be a problem for a company like
General Electric. But at moments of great stress in the economy—such
as we experienced recently—many corporations may experience cashflow strains simultaneously. 186 If those companies now have less, not
more, time to repay their loans, the chances of default will necessarily
increase.
One or two defaults may not necessarily pose a serious threat. But
as we saw with Lehman Brothers in 2008, 187 even a single default can
trigger market-wide problems if large investors react precipitously. If all
money market loans have shorter maturities, then any defaults will come
faster and more quickly—precisely the sort of cascade that will
accelerate and exacerbate widespread panics.
The SEC should be seeking to lengthen the potential time for greater
reflection and intervention, by both private parties and regulators, in
future moments of financial stress. But these new maturity requirements
do the opposite. In essence, the SEC appears to have purchased a minor
reduction in risk to the shareholders of money market funds with a major
increase in risk to the entire system of credit.
B. The Continued Use of Credit Ratings Agencies
Perhaps the most curious decision of the SEC in response to all that
has occurred in the past two years is its renewed endorsement of the
credit ratings agencies. 188 In its newest rules, the SEC continues to limit a
money market fund’s investments only to securities that have been
rated—and rated highly—by NRSROs. 189 If there is widespread
consensus on the profound failure of any single component of the U.S.
185. See id.
186. See PAULSON, supra note 4, at 235.
187. See MCDONALD, supra note 8.
188. See Money Market Fund Reform Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 10,060, 10,068–
69 (Mar. 4, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274); Frank Partnoy, Historical
Perspectives on the Financial Crisis: Ivar Kreuger, the Credit-Rating Agencies, and Two
Theories about the Function, and Dysfunction, of Markets, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 431,442
(2009) [hereinafter Partnoy, Historical Perspectives] (“Over time, private use of credit
ratings grew to mimic regulatory use. . . . Instead of using judgment to assess credit risk
or even looking to key measures of credit risk—especially probability of default—private
actors simply relied on ratings.”).
189. See Money Market Fund Reform Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 10,068.
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financial system during the recent crisis, surely it is with these ratings
agencies that continued to assign their highest ratings to securitized
bundles of ultimately worthless subprime mortgages. 190 Yet when
regulations require the use of such agencies, these agencies will continue
to operate and, very likely, to continue to mislead investors with false
assurances as to the safety of investments. Rather than attempting to
swaddle the dangers of money market investments with misleading credit
ratings, the SEC should be doing all it can to inform investors that the
risks of these funds are real and potentially expensive. No regulation—
by the SEC or any other financial regulator—should continue to rely on
these privileged and prodigal NRSROs.
The SEC argues for the continued use of these agencies as a “screen
on credit quality.” 191 But the SEC has also been quick to emphasize that
the advisors of money market funds are legally obliged to “perform an
independent credit analysis of every security purchased.” 192
In light of this requirement of an independent credit analysis by the
fund’s sponsor, the continued use of the agencies remains truly
perplexing. As Professor Partnoy and many others argue, the credit
agencies suffer from serious and irredeemable capture. 193 That is,
agencies rate only the securities of issuers who pay them for precisely
that service. Naturally, issuers who seek high ratings will migrate their
business to agencies that offer favorable ratings, leading to systemic
grade inflation by all agencies that wish to remain in business.194
These artificially high ratings are worse than useless because, with
the regulatory imprimatur of the SEC, they falsely assure investors that
investments are stronger and safer than they truly are. Having no such
assurance might prompt investors—or their intermediaries—to conduct
their own due diligence or at least to exercise caution. 195 But learning
that a security has a AAA rating might coax investors into transactions
that are, in fact, far more perilous.
Dissenting SEC Commissioner Kathleen Casey notes that ratings
and their use by the SEC “have long acted as a crutch rather than a
safeguard for many investors, creating a false sense of comfort and
protection and effectively encouraging their use as a substitute for due

190. See, e.g., Kia Dennis, The Ratings Game: Explaining Rating Agency
Failures in the Build Up to the Financial Crisis, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1111, 1113 (2009).
191. Press Release, SEC, SEC Approves Money Market Fund Reforms to Better
Protect Investors (Jan. 27, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-14.htm.
192. Id.
193. See Dennis, supra note 190, at 1124–25; Partnoy, Historical Perspectives,
supra note 188, at 438, 442; Frank Partnoy, Siskel and Ebert, supra note 36.
194. See Partnoy, Siskel and Ebert, supra note 36, at 623.
195. Id. at 623–24.
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diligence - not only on the part of funds and investors, but regulators as
well.” 196
As with the foregoing maturity requirements, the SEC’s reliance
upon ratings agencies whose abysmal performance has been widely
condemned increases rather than decreases the likelihood of future runs
on money market funds and consequential failures of the credit markets.
C. The Retention of a Fixed NAV
A false sense of security is perhaps the single largest peril of money
market funds today. These funds convey an artificial impression that they
are as safe as bank accounts, when recent events so clearly demonstrate
that they are not. This sense of security is certainly exacerbated by the
continued reliance upon ratings agencies, but the chief culprit in
propagating this impression is the fixed NAV, because it so closely
resembles the fixed obligations of a bank account. Yet in its newest
rulemaking, the SEC has missed an ideal opportunity to return to the
floating NAV that money market funds originally used. 197
The SEC justifies its continued permission for fixed NAVs by
pointing out that investors enjoy tax and accounting advantages through
this mechanism. 198 Even assuming that claim is true, it would be so only
because of regulatory largesse, not because of any inherent design
innovation. Indeed, it would beg the question why these funds, and not
all funds, should be allowed to enjoy such preferential treatment. Or, the
related query, why should not all funds—regardless of their pricing
structure—be granted equal tax and accounting treatment? The SEC is,
in effect, providing a regulatory subsidy to one specific kind of
investment over others.
The fixed NAV has been defended with an admixture of stare
decisis and free-market economics. Professor Mercer Bullard, for
example, has argued that:
Money market funds have always been viewed as bank
equivalents. A conversion to floating-NAV [money market
funds] would likely reverse three decades of market-driven
disintermediation from banks to [money market funds] and
thereby eliminate competition for bank deposit accounts,

196. Kathleen L. Casey, Comm’r, SEC, Statement on Proposing Release, Money
Market Fund Reform (Jan. 27, 2010).
197. See Money Market Fund Reform Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 10,060, 10,060
(Mar. 4, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274).
198. See Money Market Fund Reform Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,688,
32,688–89 (July 8, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274).
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increase the cost of short-term capital intermediation, and risk a
destabilizing run on [money market funds]. 199
Bullard offered this defense of the fixed NAV primarily in advocating
for government insurance of money market funds, not in defending the
new SEC rules or status quo ante. 200 Yet one might take issue with
claims that money market funds and bank accounts have always been
equivalents and that whatever happened over the past three decades was
“market-driven.” When first offered, money market accounts featured
floating NAVs and did not offer the array of check-writing, ATM, and
other bank-like conveniences (because those conveniences require the
greater predictability of fixed pricing). 201 Thus, the two investments were
not always equivalents; when money market funds first appeared, they
were quite different from bank accounts. The two became equivalents
only through the concerted efforts of fund sponsors to achieve legislative
and optical similarities to bank accounts. Moreover, claims that the
inflow of money to money markets has been “market-driven” ignore the
predicate effects of regulation upon available market choices. Indeed,
such a claim is akin to suggesting that the growth of high fructose corn
syrup ahead of imported sugar is “market-driven” without
acknowledging the role that massive government subsidies play in the
success of one of those sweeteners. 202
Both the SEC and the fund industry argue that, through disclosure,
fund investors are disabused of the notion that money market funds are
guaranteed or insured in the manner of bank accounts.203 Indeed, they
claim that all investors in these funds are acutely aware that their
investments are subject to loss.204 But nowhere in the SEC’s copious
rulemaking materials is any empirical evidence produced to that effect.
When one considers the history of the growth of these funds, one sees a
consistent and concerted attempt by fund sponsors to make money
market funds appear as similar as possible to bank accounts. For the
industry now to claim that investors never bought their ruse is cheeky at
best and deceptive at worst.

199. Bullard, supra note 144, at 28.
200. Id. at 1, 28.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 23–27.
202. See, e.g., Stephen D. Sugarman & Nirit Sandman, Fighting Childhood
Obesity Through Performance-Based Regulation of the Food Industry, 56 DUKE L.J.
1403, 1432 (“The federal government directly subsidizes certain farming interests in
ways that allow them to keep their prices down and increase quantities consumed. The
subsidy of corn-based sugar products is especially troubling in this regard . . . .”).
203. See Money Market Fund Reform Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at
32,709–10.
204. See id. at 32,710.
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D. The Relevance of the Primary Fund’s Failure

Even if one were to view the rationales and arguments supporting
the SEC’s new rules in the light most favorable to the SEC, the failure of
the Reserve Primary Fund ineffably alters the future calculus for these
funds. Whatever investors and the capital markets may once have
believed about money market funds has been altered fundamentally by
the events of late 2008. When the U.S. government stepped in to
guarantee these funds against failure, it crystallized the suspicion that
money market funds are, in fact, insured against loss. Or at least the
government implicitly provides that insurance.205 But perhaps the only
thing worse than operating without insurance is operating with insurance
for which none of the players pays. That scenario is always the prelude to
moral hazard and future failures.206
If a financial instrument operates with a fixed return, it must either
arrange a mechanism to guarantee that return or be prepared to suffer
runs at the first suspicion that the return is no longer fixed.207 But money
market funds attempted to have the best of both worlds: a fixed return
without the costs of a guarantee. In retrospect, the industry argues that it
never claimed to offer a fixed return. Industry supporters argue that
disclosure documents clearly state that money market funds are not
insured and are at risk. 208 The events of 2008, however, demonstrate that
the financial authorities simply cannot afford to allow this enormous
sector of the economy to fail.209
These events have taught investors that the failure of even one
money market fund may create systemic dysfunction and that the U.S.
government will not allow such a failure. In the future, perhaps events
will not conspire to create the same degree of damage from the breaking
of a single buck, but some fund sponsors may still be prepared to
gamble. If money market funds continue to operate without paying
insurance to cover their returns, problems are more likely to occur in the
future than they were before. Individual fund sponsors can now make
riskier investments in higher yielding securities, either to capture market
share or to increase profits, all the while knowing that if they overreach
and their funds fail, the government may be standing by as an insurer.
Again, Booth offers a specific prediction: “Presumably, it is only a
205. See Booth, supra note 120, at 65 (“[T]he illusion that MMFs were risk-free
created a moral hazard that led depositors to move more funds into MMFs than they
should have.”).
206. See, e.g., David S. Miller, Note, Insurance as Contract: The Argument for
Abandoning the Ambiguity Doctrine, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1849, 1863 (1988).
207. See FRANKEL & KIRSCH, supra note 43, at 463.
208. See Money Market Fund Reform Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 32,712.
209. See PAULSON, supra note 4.
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matter of time before someone offers an uninsured [money market funds]
with higher returns.” 210 Yet a basic premise of all insurance is that those
who take the risks must be the ones to internalize the costs of the
insurance. When individuals do not pay for their own mistakes, moral
hazard abounds. 211
Thus, even if the SEC’s rationales were compelling in a vacuum,
they are no longer so. The SEC must now address the very real sense of
an implicit guarantee that greatly increases the moral hazard and
systemic risk associated with these funds.
III. NEW SOLUTIONS FOR MONEY MARKET FUNDS
The SEC could quickly remediate the perils of moral hazard and
systemic risk in money market funds and credit markets simply by
reducing the level of obfuscation in its current approach. By adopting the
lessons of neoclassical, 212 behavioral, 213 or prudential regulation, the
agency could quickly encode a new set of rules to bring greater
transparency to this vital and once-ignored sector of the economy. Two
simple but fundamental changes could accomplish a great deal of this
work: either return to the floating NAV or establish an insurance facility
to guarantee deposits in money market funds.
A. Neoclassical Economics and a Floating NAV
Neoclassical law and economic theory emphasizes the primacy of
market forces in achieving optimal social welfare. As Professors Ronald
Gilson and Reinier Kraakman argued in their seminal article two decades
ago, the efficient capital market hypothesis—and its reliance on a market
for information—is “the context in which serious discussion of the
regulation of financial markets takes place.” 214 Neoclassical theory
promotes a disclosure-based approach to financial regulation, positing
that through a sufficiently competitive market for information, investors
and their agents will quickly and effectively process risk and price in the
capital markets. 215 Ostensibly following this theoretical framework, the
SEC itself states publicly that “[o]nly through the steady flow of timely,
210. Booth, supra note 120, at 65.
211. See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 145, at 489 (“The Lehman/Reserve Primary
Fund situation illustrates the difficult choice between providing a government rescue to
prevent systemic consequences . . . and limiting moral hazard.”)
212. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 15.
213. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 168.
214. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 550 (1989).
215. See id. at 631–32.

BIRDTHISTLE – FINAL

1190

12/14/2010 2:22 PM

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

comprehensive, and accurate information can people make sound
investment decisions.” 216
But the SEC’s approach toward the regulation of money market
funds is fundamentally in conflict with transparency. Indeed, the SEC’s
rules have done much to obscure the true risks associated with money
market funds by abetting the efforts by fund sponsors to make their funds
resemble bank accounts. Were the pricing mechanism of these funds to
revert to their original floating status, all fund investors would be
reminded daily—even without digging deep into formal disclosure
documents—of the possible losses from their investments. Yet the
conservative nature of money market portfolios would limit losses and,
on occasion, even offset them with gains.
1. TRANSPARENCY
The SEC appears to accept the industry’s contention that statements
in official prospectuses and Statements of Additional Information
effectively convey to all money market fund investors the claim that their
fund investments are perpetually at risk. 217 Yet a great deal of scholarly
work has demonstrated the very real limitations of financial disclosure.218
Few investors read these documents; fewer still comprehend their import
and act accordingly. 219
These limitations would be true even if the money market fund
industry had not spent a great deal of effort attempting to override these
disclosures. Although all fund sponsors file their legally required
disclaimers, they wink at those statements of risk through the enormous
promotional effort they put into far more visible intimations of stability
in these funds. Money market funds are regularly referred to as “cash or
cash equivalent;” 220 they are furnished with check-writing and ATM
privileges, and they are provided with the all-important fixed price that
no other investment fund is permitted to use. 221
216. The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains
Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION,
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml
(last
modified
Sept. 20, 2010).
217. See Money Market Fund Reform Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,688,
32,710 (July 8, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274).
218. See, e.g., James D. Cox & John W. Payne, Mutual Fund Expense
Disclosures: A Behavioral Perspective, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 907, 926 (2005) (explaining
why, under current disclosure practices, investors cannot be relied upon to make rational
choices).
219. See id.
220. James J. Eccleston, SEC Issues Helpful Investment Guide, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., May 8, 2006, at 5.
221. See FRANKEL & KIRSCH, supra note 43, at 463.
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Indeed, the success of the industry’s efforts to assure investors of
the stability of money market funds became clearest during the panic of
2008. Even though the Primary Fund stood to lose less than 2 percent of
its value, the breaking of its buck represented a profound violation of
trust—investors ran for the exits immediately. 222 If they had believed that
their investments were truly at risk, that their assets might fluctuate a few
pennies up or down on any given day, then panic on that scale ought to
have been very unlikely.
But if we accept the contention that most investors understood how
money market funds operate, what then ought to be done about the
benighted few? Should financial regulation of money market funds
accommodate the wise or the foolish? One might argue that the industry
filed their required disclosure announcing that money market fund
investments were at risk, and that anyone who failed to read or to believe
those warnings is a fool and, further, that crafting regulation to
accommodate imprudent customers is a poor policy. While such an
approach might be reasonable for sophisticated financial sectors, in
which counterparties possess equal bargaining power and information, it
makes less sense for an inherently retail product. 223 But what about the
presence of institutional investors in this sector—won’t they protect the
interests of individual investors? While sophisticated players do often
discipline a market to the benefit of all participants,224 in this scenario,
retail and institutional investors often invest in separate money market
funds. 225 Thus in the absence of regulation that reasonably accounts for
the ability—and inability—of retail investors, problems will assuredly
occur.
Professor Gordon follows his lapidary analysis of the flaws of
money market funds with a specific recommendation along these lines:
“A minimum reform strategy should create a sharp divide between retail
MMFs (“RMMFs”) and institutional MMFs (“IMMFs”).” 226 He then
outlines ways in which the bifurcated species of funds ought to be
regulated differently. As a practical matter, this separation is largely
already in place, as many fund sponsors offer funds with similar
portfolios but different prices to different clients. 227 And, as the lessons
of mutual fund pricing demonstrate, such a separation is not always
222. See Mamudi & Burton, supra note 2.
223. See generally William A. Birdthistle, Investment Indiscipline: A Behavioral
Approach to Mutual Fund Jurisprudence, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 61 [hereinafter Birdthistle,
Investment Indiscipline ].
224. See id. at 72.
225. See id. at 72–73.
226. Letter from Jeffrey N. Gordon to Elizabeth M. Murphy, supra note 35,
at 9.
227. Birdthistle, supra note 223, at 73.
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positive. When institutional and retail investors do not invest in identical
funds, the prices of those similar products may quickly diverge. Thus,
Professor Gordon’s proposal to reduce risk might lead to a disparity in
pricing.
Yet proponents of these rules might contend that no change is
needed here. Money market funds have broken the buck only twice in
their history and, both times, investors stood to lose only pennies on the
dollar. 228 Indeed, some might say that the system operated correctly this
time, with the system avoiding collapse and Reserve shareholders losing
just 1 percent of their investment.
Such rare and minimal risks, so the argument might go, simply do
not warrant significant changes to an industry. This argument glosses
over two problems: first, without changes, the frequency of future
mishaps is much higher today than before the 2008 meltdown; second,
the relatively minor losses to fund shareholders completely omits the
massive and profound losses that would have accrued in the capital
markets if the federal government had not intervened. As the director of
the SEC’s Division of Investment Management, Andrew J. Donohue, put
it, “the events of the fall of 2008 showed that money market funds are
susceptible to runs, particularly by institutional investors. . . . [and]
precipitated a massive intervention with respect to money market funds
that many in the government would not like to see repeated.”229
Each of the counterarguments to a floating NAV rests on the
implicit and remarkable assumption that the market will perform better if
investors are offered less transparency and furnished with an inaccurate
view of these funds. Yet decades of financial theory and empirical
studies demonstrate the opposite: that with greater transparency comes
healthier, more efficient, and more effective markets.230 If the SEC
emphasized the perils of these funds to investors, many investors may
still choose to invest in them (albeit fully cognizant of the risks), while
others may choose either to invest in less risky, less rewarding
alternatives, such as bank accounts, or more risky, more rewarding
alternatives, such as short-term bond funds. Without a regulatory thumb
on the scale, the market could provide a better picture of the price and
risk of these securities, and investors would not operate in an artificial
bubble ignorant of growing systemic risks.

228. See supra text accompanying notes 4–7.
229. Andrew J. Donohue, Director, Div. of Inv. Mgmt., SEC, Remarks Before
the Practicing Law Institute’s Investment Management Institute (Apr. 8, 2010).
230. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 214, at 552, 554.
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2. EQUALIZING REGULATORY BENEFITS AND BURDENS
With one concerted step, the SEC could level the competitive field
both between money market funds and all other mutual funds as well as
between money market funds and bank accounts. By reverting to the
regulatory framework that the SEC maintained during the early years of
money market funds—in which they, like all mutual funds, were required
to use a floating NAV 231—and systemic foibles of this investment could
be policed with robust market mechanisms.
If the SEC repealed the use of amortized-cost accounting—which it
could do with a straightforward amendment of Rule 2a-7 232—money
market funds would then be obliged to use mark-to-market accounting. 233
Inasmuch as most investment advisors who sponsor money market funds
also oversee large mutual fund complexes, the industry could quickly
adopt this technical alteration. The price of money market funds would
then begin to float and, shortly thereafter, investors in those funds would
see their daily NAVs oscillate between a few pennies above and below
the $1.00 price. This fluctuation would communicate far more effectively
than any prospectus disclosure the fact that these funds carry the risk of
loss and thereby help to forestall any future runs on the industry.
If a money market fund experienced the collapse of one of its
investments, as the Primary Fund did with its Lehman Brothers
holdings, 234 the price of that fund would drop a few pennies lower than
usual, but investors would not be alarmed at the violation of any sort of
iron-clad guarantee. But even if investors did exit the fund, they would
not trigger a run because a floating NAV is, by definition, immune to
such phenomena. 235
Certain investors, however, may greatly value the stability of the
$1.00 price in money market funds, and a floating NAV would eliminate
this feature. Indeed, one might argue that changing money market funds
might reduce investor choices and permit unhealthy market
concentrations in the remaining options. On the contrary, a wide variety
of choices would remain.
For any investor who demands the predictability of fixed balance—
in order to write checks or simply to plan future activities—a financial
product already exists: the bank account. Similarly, bank accounts will

231. See Levin, supra note 42, at 750–53.
232. Id. at 750–51.
233. See Money Market Fund Reform Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,688,
32,690 (July 8, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274).
234. See Henriques, supra note 44, at BU13.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 78–82.

BIRDTHISTLE – FINAL

1194

12/14/2010 2:22 PM

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

accommodate those investors with more conservative investment
profiles.
But bank accounts typically offer lower yields than money market
funds. 236 Certainly, that is true, primarily because bank accounts must
pay insurance on their deposits to the FDIC. In essence, money market
funds have received free insurance, with disastrous results and equally
dire prospects in the absence of revisions. Money market funds, their
investors, and their sponsors have all enjoyed higher yields by
transferring the risk of their investments to the American taxpayers. 237
Both the equities of that structure, as well as its promotion of moral
hazard, require its termination.
For those money market investors who do prioritize a higher yield
and will not be satisfied with bank accounts, products already exist for
this taste: short-term bond funds. Short-term bond funds hold
investments extremely similar to those in money market funds, but are
structured as classic mutual funds, and thus already have floating
NAVs. 238 They carry a higher yield than bank accounts and reflect more
accurate risks for those rewards. 239 In the absence of the SEC’s
regulatory subsidy, money market funds must reflect price and risk that
are true reflections of the prevailing market rate.
The industry argues that investors will move offshore to riskier and
unregulated products. 240 But that supposition prompts two replies:
unlikely and so what? Unlike hedge fund investors, about whom the
“offshore” argument is commonly deployed,241 money market investors
are not seeking outsized returns, privacy, or investment expertise. 242
Onshore bank accounts and short-term bond funds already offer money
market investors the straightforward investments they seek. Why move
offshore when abundant and comparable investments are available next
door? Fund sponsors contend that the market has already spoken by

236. See ICI FACT BOOK, supra note 3, at 34 (noting that for the first time in the
last fifteen years, yields on money market funds were lower than those on bank accounts
in 2009).
237. An Inadequate Case for the Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2008, at A26.
238. See, e.g., J.P. MORGAN, JPMorgan Short Duration Bond Fund, in
PROSPECTUS: J.P. MORGAN INCOME FUNDS 10 (July 1, 2010) (describing the investment
strategies and holdings of this open-end mutual fund).
239. See, e.g., id.
240. See Money Market Fund Reform Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,688,
32,718 (July 8, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274).
241. E.g., Kathleen E. Lange, Note, The New Antifraud Rule: Is SEC
Enforcement the Most Effective Way to Protect Investors from Hedge Fund Fraud?, 77
FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 873–74 (2008).
242. See supra text accompanying notes 46-47.
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pouring more than $3 trillion into these funds. 243 But this argument
ignores the enormous regulatory thumb on the scale—investors have
chosen a product whose price is artificially low because of governmental
intervention. Again, to attribute the popularity of corn in the United
States to superior performance rather than to massive government
subsidy is woefully naive, or disingenuous. 244 Asking customers to
purchase bank accounts or short-term bond funds, as may befit their
preference for risk and yield, is simply a regulatory-neutral position that
defers to market forces.
The market for short-term paper will be largely unaffected,
inasmuch as bank accounts and short-term bond funds will replace fixedrate money market funds as purchasers in accordance with the migration
of investors. Corporate issuers of commercial paper will not care whether
Bank of America’s savings funds or Bank of America’s money market
funds are lending them money. Any temporary disruption to these
channels will be replaced quickly with buyers already operating within
the system. In short, money market funds have enjoyed thirty years of
regulatory largesse, whose elimination effectively rectifies an old but
growing threat.
B. Behavioral Economics and the Selection of Winners
The work of Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler emphasizes some of
the shortcomings in neoclassical economic theory. 245 The market is
deficient in processing information, they argue, because of biases,
distractions, and shortcomings in so many market participants.246 Rather
than leaving all decisions to a completely unregulated agora, therefore,
regulators should be prepared to offer “libertarian paternalism” in the
form of choice architecture. 247 That is, without actually restricting the
choices of market participants, regulators may still privilege certain
options over others.

243. See Money Market Fund Reform Proposed Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. at 32,689;
Sugarman & Sandman, supra note 202, at 1432 (discussing corn subsidies); see also
Navigating New Rules: Q&A w/ Stephen Keen, MONEY FUND INTELLIGENCE, Feb. 2010,
at 1, 3–4 (“People who actually have money invested in funds, particularly individuals,
uniformly said, ‘Don’t do that. I don’t want a fluctuating product, and I don’t want to
have to put my money in a bank. I like what money market funds do. I know I have a risk
of loss. I accept that.’”).
244. See D. Daniel Sokol, Limiting Anticompetitive Interventions That Benefit
Special Interests, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 119, 127 (2009).
245. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 168.
246. See id.
247. Id.
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As an excellent example of behavioral theory applied to financial
regulation, consider the Pension Protection Act of 2006. 248 Prior to that
law, any proceeds employees saved in their retirement accounts that they
did not allocate to a specific investment were required, by law, to be held
as cash. 249 In many cases, the obliviousness or busyness of employees
would result in retirement assets languishing well below levels necessary
for healthy savings. 250 The Pension Protection Act permitted retirement
administrators to direct unallocated investments into conservative,
passively managed, broadly diversified mutual funds instead.251 In both
scenarios, employees could easily change the allocation of their
investments. The behavioral approach, however, took account of
shortcomings in the existing approach and simply altered the default
setting, which has resulted in far higher savings rates for plan
participants. 252
In the context of money market funds, one might argue that
behavioral economic theory might justify the SEC’s behavior even if
neoclassical theory does not. For instance, one could argue that the SEC
has surveyed the available options and simply privileged money market
funds for their optimal combination of safety, yield, and convenience.
Indeed, the argument might proceed, requiring a floating NAV might
exacerbate future runs because investors might panic sooner if they see a
fund’s value declining or because the “true” price of short-term debt
becomes highly unreliable during moments of market stress.
But, again, investors simply cannot trigger a run on any financial
portfolio that promises only to pay them a pro rata portion of whatever
the portfolio holds. Runs occur when investors are promised more than a
pro rata portion, and thus have an incentive to be the first to withdraw
their portions before the corpus is exhausted. 253 More importantly, the
SEC has not simply placed an existing financial option at the top of a
menu of choices; it has, through rulemaking, affirmatively altered the
nature of investment options by giving one an advantage that could not
exist without regulatory intervention.

248. See Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 624, 120 Stat.
980 (2006).
249. See Birdthistle, Investment Indiscipline, supra note 223, at 67.
250. See, e.g., James J. Choi et al., For Better or for Worse: Default Effects and
401(k) Savings Behavior, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE ECONOMICS OF AGING 81, 81–121
(David A. Wise ed., 2004).
251. Pension Protection Act of 2006, § 624(a)(5).
252. Birdthistle, Investment Indiscipline, supra note 223, at 67.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 77–81.
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C. Prudential Regulation and Mandatory Insurance
Regulation is, of course, a central feature of even financial systems
that purport to be heavily market-oriented and laissez-faire. 254 Indeed, in
the United States, earnest debates about financial oversight do not
seriously contemplate either a truly unregulated system or a truly
controlled system—the debate is largely one of degree. Prudential, or
merit, regulation therefore often plays some role.255 One of the few
widely celebrated examples of financial-merit regulation is the success of
the FDIC’s record of insuring bank accounts. If the SEC declines to
require money market funds to use a floating NAV, then it should adopt
some equivalent system of insurance.
With every financial instrument, some party must be prepared to
absorb the loss of unfortunate market events. A floating NAV places the
risk of that loss on investors in a fund. A fixed NAV requires that some
other party do so. Indeed, a fixed price always carries an assurance,
express or implied, that someone will make customers whole if the
investment fails. 256 In the events involving the Primary Fund, the federal
government placed billions of public dollars at risk to avoid collapse. In
bank accounts, the FDIC does so as well, but only after being paid to do
so by depositors through their banks. 257 A few variations on this
insurance scheme might be equally useful in the context of money
market funds.
1. THE EXISTING, UNSPOKEN INSURANCE REGIME
The first option would be to continue with the current regime.
Currently, money market funds offer the strong suggestion to investors
that their investments are stable, safe, and secure. When that assurance
proved false, as it did with the Reserve Fund, the Federal government
guaranteed depositors against loss. 258 That is, the government offered
implicit insurance for money market funds without charging specific

254. See, e.g., Mohammad H. Fadel, Riba, Efficiency, and Prudential
Regulation: Preliminary Thoughts, 25 WIS. INT’L L.J. 655, 695 (2008) (explaining that
Islamic financial law adopts a laissez-faire attitude towards business dealing, but also has
regulatory aspects).
255. See id. at 657 (arguing that Islamic financial law regulation is part of a
larger prudential scheme).
256. See Henriques, supra note 44.
257. Who is the FDIC?, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION,
http://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/symbol/WhoistheFdIC.pdf (last updated Aug. 11, 2010).
258. See Press Release, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, supra note 10.
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insurance premia to any of the participants—investors, funds, sponsors,
lenders—in this system. 259
As we have seen, insurance that is given to parties who do not pay
for it cultivates significant moral hazard and, if left in place, provides
every incentive for participants to increase the risk of their activities.
Investors have every incentive to put their money into money market
funds offering the very highest yield, while funds and sponsors have
every incentive to choose investments with the highest degree of risk and
reward. If these decisions turn out to be poor ones, the loss will be borne
by all U.S. taxpayers.
Such a system, needless to say, will greatly exacerbate, not mitigate,
the future likelihood of runs on money market funds and systemic risk in
the capital markets. In light of the equally problematic rules shortening
maturities in money market funds, the status quo would appear to be
untenable.
2. SELF-INSURANCE
A second alternative would be to require the sponsors and advisors
of money market funds to insure their funds themselves. 260 Such a
system has been in place informally for several decades.261 With two
very notable exceptions, in all previous instances in which funds have
threatened to break their buck, their investment advisors provided selfinsurance to the fund’s investors. 262 That is, the advisors or their
affiliates intervened to purchase at full value portfolio securities whose
values had declined precipitously and threatened to break the buck. In
essence, the advisors paid money out of their own pockets to insure the
loss and to make fund investors whole. The advisors paid for this
insurance through the premia of previous profits they had made from
managing the funds.
In many respects, this system most perfectly aligns the interests and
risks of money market funds—if the people most directly responsible for
managing the funds are also the people who stand to lose the most from
mistakes, they will take the optimal degree of care in running the funds.
The limitations, however, are clearly visible in cases such as the Primary
Fund. 263 Whenever the advisor simply does not have sufficient capital to

259. See id.
260. See, e.g., Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Massachusetts Health Plan: Public
Insurance for the Poor, Private Insurance for the Wealthy, Self-Insurance for the Rest?,
55 U. KAN. L. REV. 1091 (2007).
261. See Henriques, supra note 44.
262. See Mamudi & Burton, supra note 2.
263. See Henriques, supra note 44.
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buy its own fund, the fund will fail and the system will face collateral
risks. Or, indeed, if fund sponsors believe the government will insure
their losses, they will have a powerful incentive not to resuscitate their
own failing funds. Thus a broader insurance pool is necessary to address
the true amount of risk in these funds.
3. COLLECTIVE INSURANCE
A third option would be to follow the example of the banking
industry’s collective insurance.264 Money market funds could either
mutually or governmentally insure their risk across the entire industry by
having all funds pay into a common pool that would rescue any fund that
failed. Of course, all funds would have to pay insurance premia, the cost
of which would in turn be passed through to all investors in those funds.
That additional cost would naturally reduce the yield for all funds, but
only by the true cost of securing these investments.265
The current system is cheaper, but only because none of the
industry’s constituents is paying for their actual risk. Inasmuch as
different funds operate with different risk profiles, so too could the
premia be risk-adjusted, 266 so that the actual costs of investing with a
guaranteed return are internalized with the most accurate allocation
possible. Insurance certainly will not prevent future investment failures,
but, as the FDIC has demonstrated, it can protect both investors
individually and the capital markets more systemically.
CONCLUSION
The shattering of the buck in the Reserve Primary Fund
dramatically demonstrated two suspected but unspoken fears about what
were once considered among the economy’s safest and surest
investments. Contrary to the industry’s long attempt to conflate money
market funds with bank accounts, the global markets witnessed the
serious magnitude of the risk that funds carry, not solely to themselves
and their investors, but also to the broader credit and capital markets.
When the Primary Fund stumbled, investors fled what they feared were
Potemkin bank accounts, and the credit markets promptly seized. 267

264. See Johnson, supra note 37.
265. See Bullard, supra note 144.
266. Letter from Jeffrey N. Gordon to Elizabeth M. Murphy, supra note 35, at 2–
10 (discussing possible ways to adjust fund insurance payments for their respective risk
profiles).
267. See PAULSON, supra note 4, at 234–37.
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Notwithstanding this vivid demonstration, the SEC’s regulatory
response has been disappointingly incoherent and ineffective. Shunning
the principles and guidance of widely accepted legal economic theories,
the SEC adopted instead not just an incoherent set of risk-reduction
measures but also an ineffectual one. By shortening the permissible
maturities of money market funds, the SEC has actually increased the
likely velocity and force of future runs without making any
compensatory effort to address the newly enhanced peril of moral
hazard.
Neoclassical and behavioral economic theories proffer two
alternative approaches that would eliminate the regulatory subsidy of
these investments while improving the health of the capital markets. By
either replacing fixed NAVs with floating ones or, instead, requiring the
industry to adopt insurance to cover their fixed obligations, the SEC
might increase the transparency and long-term well-being of a
cornerstone of the U.S. economy.

